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I. INTRODUCTION
In the decade since Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Inc., federal judges have exercised their role as gatekeepers of expert
witness testimony to evaluate many different categories of scientific
evidence.1 They have not done so without controversy, however.
Because the element of causation in pharmaceutical product litigation
1.509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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is frequently dispositive, 2 the application of Daubert to scientific
evidence of causation has been particularly contentious. Plaintiffs in
such cases must prove both general causation-that the product is
capable of causing an injury of the type from which the plaintiff
suffers-and specific causation-that the product was the actual cause
of the plaintiffs injury.3 Daubert itself involved the admissibility of
evidence of general causation in a pharmaceutical product liability
action.4 Of particular interest here is Daubert's application to a
common type of specific causation evidence known as differential
diagnosis evidence. "Differential diagnosis" refers to the process by
which a clinical physician, for purposes of treatment, identifies the
condition affecting his patient and/or its cause.5 The admissibility of
differential diagnosis evidence is crucial to a plaintiffs pharmaceutical
product liability case, as testimony from a clinical physician that the
drug product is the most likely cause of the plaintiffs condition is
frequently the plaintiffs only means of proving specific causation. 6
Application of the Daubert standard to differential diagnosis
testimony has engendered particular disagreement and confusion in
the federal courts over the past several years. The recent series of
cases surrounding Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation's ("Sandoz")
lactation-suppressing drug Parlodel aptly illustrates the uncertainty
surrounding the admissibility of differential diagnosis evidence. After
reports of a possible association between Parlodel and strokes, Sandoz
withdrew the drug from the market as a lactation suppressant in 1994
at the request of the Food and Drug Administration. 7 In the ensuing
litigation, plaintiffs claimed that their ingestion of Parlodel caused
them to suffer strokes." Courts have disagreed, however, on the
reliability of the differential diagnosis evidence offered by these
2. See Michael B. Kent, Daubert, Doctors and Differential Diagnosis: Treating Medical
Causation Testimony as Evidence, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 525, 525 (1999).
3. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988).
4. 509 U.S. at 582-85.
5. "Differential diagnosis," as I use the term in this Note, is more properly referred to as
"differential etiology." The term "differential diagnosis" actually refers to the process by which
physicians diagnose a patient's condition, rather than the cause of that condition. See, e.g.,
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §
20-1.1 (2d ed. 2002). "Differential etiology," on the other hand, refers to the process of causal
assessment. See id. This Note uses the term "differential diagnosis" to refer to the process of
elucidating the cause of the plaintiffs injury, rather than "differential etiology," because courts
typically refer to the process of causal determination as "differential diagnosis."
6. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2002).
8. See, e.g., id. at 1198-99 (discussing the Parlodel controversy in the courts).
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plaintiffs as part of their effort to prove causation. 9 For example, on
September 12, 2001, a federal district court judge in Illinois granted
Sandoz's motion to exclude the expert opinions of two physicians
prepared to testify based on a differential diagnosis that Parlodel
caused the plaintiff to suffer a stroke several days after ingesting the
drug. 10 Nine days later, a federal magistrate in Alabama denied a
similar motion brought by the same defendant regarding the same
experts, the same drug, and the same type of injury in a suit brought
by a different plaintiff." Purportedly applying the same admissibility
standard-namely, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 12 ("Rule
702" or "the Rule")-the federal court in Alabama found the proffered
differential diagnosis testimony reliable and therefore admissible,
while the federal court in Illinois had found it unreliable and therefore
inadmissible.' 3 In addition to excluding this crucial expert testimony
on causation, the Illinois court granted the defendant leave to file a
motion for summary judgment.' 4 The Alabama case, on the other
hand, proceeded to trial. 15
As these two cases demonstrate, the admissibility of clinical
medical evidence of causation has a tremendous impact on the course
of product liability litigation and is therefore a determination that
should be undertaken carefully. Too much judicial control over
scientific evidence of causation may prematurely end potentially
meritorious litigation with a summary judgment motion in the
defendant's favor. Such an outcome fails to compensate a potentially
deserving plaintiff for her injury and allows the perpetrator of
potentially tortious activity to escape liability.
On the other hand, too little control over scientific evidence of
causation risks jury verdicts that are inconsistent with the weight of
the scientific evidence. For example, the series of cases involving
Bendectin, a drug prescribed to prevent nausea during pregnancy,
9. See, e.g., Mark Hansen, When Expert Testimony Fails the Test: District Courts Disagree
on What Defines Causation Evidence in Drug Disability Cases, 88 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (2002).
10. Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 1053 (S.D. Ill. 2001).
11. See Brasher v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (N.D. Ala. 2001).
12. FED. R. EVID. 702:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
13. Brasher, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1299; Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
14. Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.




resulted in repeated verdicts for plaintiffs, despite the fact that the
scientific evidence ultimately disproved any causal association
between Bendectin and birth defects. 16  Several phenomena
characteristic of mass tort litigation may contribute to this
undesirable result. First, commentators have observed that jurors
may "commingle" the elements of tort cases, substituting strong
evidence of one element for weak evidence of another.17 For example,
when the plaintiff has clearly suffered an egregious injury but no
causal association has been established, jurors may trade proof of
causation for proof of injury. 18 Second, large plaintiffs' verdicts early in
the mass tort litigation, mass media coverage, and public outrage may
fuel the success of individual claims despite the inadequacy of the
evidence. 19 Particularly in pharmaceutical product liability
litigation-where the defendant's manufacture of a single product may
result in mass tort litigation involving thousands of plaintiffs-a
series of large plaintiffs' verdicts based on unreliable or insufficient
evidence of causation may precipitate the bankruptcy of a
pharmaceutical company whose product in fact caused no injury.
The disparate outcomes of the two illustrative Parlodel cases-
cases involving the same pharmaceutical product, the same alleged
injury, the same type of evidence, and the same expert witnesses-
raise a question as to the whether federal trial courts across the
country properly apply the expert witness admissibility rules to
differential diagnosis testimony. This inquiry involves several
interrelated questions. Is there an identifiable cause of the variation
in outcomes of similar cases? Should we care about the observed
variation or is that variation a permissible result of the exercise of
judicial discretion authorized by Rule 702 that should be applauded
rather than scrutinized? If we should care, how should federal trial
courts approach the admissibility of differential diagnosis testimony
so that they exercise neither too much nor too little control over the
scientific evidence that is presented to the jury? Although the highly
fact-specific and amorphous nature of a trial court's expert witness
16. See Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the
Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993); see id. (discussing the Bendectin litigation and the
disparity between the scientific data and the evidence presented at trial); see also Rebecca S.
Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 709-15
(discussing the breast implant litigation and the ultimate disproof of any causal association
between silicone gel breast implants and immune system disorders).
17. Sanders, supra note 16, at 52-54 (describing commingling in the Bendectin cases).
18. Id.
19. See David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 484 (1999)
(reviewing MARCI ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW
IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)).
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admissibility determination renders these questions difficult to
answer, the ever-increasing importance of pharmaceutical product
liability litigation in this country necessitates their consideration.
This inquiry must begin with Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the federal admissibility standard for expert witness
testimony. Rule 702 incorporates the test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.20 The Daubert Court established a gatekeeping role for the judge
that requires him to evaluate the proffered testimony for relevance
and reliability.21 In General Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, the Court more fully described. the judge's role as
gatekeeper: the judge should evaluate the expert's reasoning,
specifically the gap between the data presented and the conclusions
drawn,22 to ensure that the expert has applied in his analysis the
same level of intellectual rigor characteristic of those who practice in
his field. 2
3
The Supreme Court's explication of the Rule 702 standard in
Joiner and Kumho Tire is particularly relevant to a trial court's
evaluation of the reliability of differential diagnosis testimony. The
Kumho Tire standard, when applied to differential diagnosis evidence,
dictates that courts evaluate the reliability of that evidence based on
its consistency with the methodologies employed by clinical physicians
in their everyday practice of medicine. Indeed, as explained in more
detail below, in pharmaceutical product litigation, courts should look
specifically to the methods by which clinical physicians diagnose
adverse drug reactions ("ADRs").
24
This Note begins in Part II with a description of the plaintiffs
burden of proving causation in a typical pharmaceutical product
liability litigation and the general nature and importance of
differential diagnosis testimony. Part II then explains Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 and the Supreme Court cases which together provide the
context for analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony. Part II
concludes by briefly applying the concept of differential diagnosis
testimony to this general framework while also pointing out the need
20. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
21. See id. at 587-95 (describing the judge's gatekeeping role); discussion infra Part II.B
(same).
22. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
23. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-52 (1999) (holding that Daubert also
applies to testimony based on "technical" or "other specialized knowledge").
24. The World Health Organization defines an adverse drug reaction as any response to a
drug that is "noxious and unintended" and occurs at prescription-level doses. Fred E. Karch &
Louis Lasagna, Adverse Drug Reactions: A Critical Review, 234 JAMA 1236, 1236 (1975).
2003] 1231
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to examine how physicians conduct differential diagnoses when
treating patients. Part III describes the approach of clinical physicians
in conducting differential diagnoses of adverse drug reactions,
including a discussion of the importance of focusing specifically on the
differential diagnosis of ADRs as opposed to differential diagnosis
methodologies in general.
Finally, Part IV applies the clinical methodology of ADR
differential diagnosis to suggest a resolution to an important issue
that currently divides federal courts-namely, when a differential
diagnosis expert testifies as to causation, whether he must
demonstrate that he has properly "ruled in" the drug in question as a
possible cause of the plaintiffs injury before "ruling out" alternative
causes and concluding that the defendant's product is the most likely
cause of the plaintiffs injury. 25 This Note concludes that courts should
not categorically exclude a differential diagnosis opinion because the
expert does not provide evidence that he has "ruled in" the drug as a
possible cause of the plaintiffs injury, as some courts do. However,
absent such evidence-provided by the differential diagnosis expert or
by other evidence offered by the plaintiff-that the drug is a possible
cause of the plaintiffs injury, the court should consider the evidence a
question of sufficiency, and, if appropriate, grant summary judgment
in the defendant's favor on that ground.26
25. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 5, § 20-1.4.2 (identifying the "ruling in" requirement as
a current point of contention).
26. Note that several commentators have recently attempted to address the variation in
federal court approaches to the admissibility of differential diagnosis evidence of causation. See,
e.g., Henry Berry, Logical Analysis: A Method of Examination of Expert Medical Opinion
Through the Basic Logic of Medical Reasoning, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 949 (1999); Harvey Brown,
Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical
Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 369 (2001); Kent, supra note 2; Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a
Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (1999); Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The
Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The
Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2001, at 107;
Gary Sloboda, Differential Diagnosis or Distortion?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 301 (2001); Note,
Navigating Uncertainty: Gatekeeping in the Absence of Hard Science, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1467
(2000). Although these commentators provide valuable insight into the problem of differential
diagnosis testimony, none specifically addresses the "ruling in" requirement, as Kumho Tire
requires, in the context of a searching analysis of the clinical methodology of the differential
diagnosis of adverse drug reactions.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Causation Element: General Versus Specific
As in any tort cause of action, the plaintiff in a product liability
action must prove causation. To recover in negligence, the plaintiff
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
breached a duty that caused the plaintiffs injury. To recover in strict
liability, a typical claim brought in litigation involving pharmaceutical
product liability, the plaintiff must prove, inter alia, the existence of
an injury caused by a product sold by the defendant. 27 To carry her
burden on causation in a pharmaceutical product liability action, the
plaintiff must prove both general causation-that the defendant's
product is capable of causing an injury of the type from which the
plaintiff suffers-and specific causation-that the defendant's product
is the cause in fact of this particular plaintiffs injury. 28
Figure 1 illustrates the difference between general and specific
causation:





27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
28. See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988); see also
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 5, § 20-1.2; Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV.
1219, 1227-28 (1987).
29. This figure is based on Michael D. Green et al., Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 352 (2d ed. 2000).
2003] 1233
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Most pharmaceutical products cause nonunique injuries. 30
Rather, in the general population of individuals not exposed to a
particular pharmaceutical product, the injury that is associated with
the drug nonetheless occurs at some frequency (Figure 1, Region A).
Thus, a background rate of injury that is entirely unrelated to drug
exposure exists in the exposed population (Region B). Evidence of
general causation demonstrates whether and to what extent the
product is capable of increasing the rate of injury above the
background rate-i.e., whether Region C exists at all and, if so, to
what extent. Once it is determined that Region C exists-in other
words, that the drug is capable of causing the plaintiffs injury-then
evidence of specific causation is intended to prove whether the
plaintiff is part of the population that would have suffered an injury
regardless of drug exposure (Region B) or instead, part of the
population that would not have suffered her injury but for drug
exposure (Region C). If the plaintiff demonstrates both that Region C
exists (general causation) and that her injury falls within it (specific
causation), then she has met her burden as to the causation element of
her product liability action.
The best and most common type of evidence of general
causation is the epidemiological study. Epidemiology is the study of
the incidence of disease in human populations. 31 Epidemiological
studies are designed specifically to demonstrate whether exposure to a
particular agent increases the incidence of disease in an exposed
versus an unexposed human population.32 The result of an
epidemiological study is a calculation of the "relative risk" of acquiring
the disease. The relative risk is a figure that represents the risk of
acquiring the disease from exposure to the drug compared to the
background rate of injury. For example, a relative risk of 1.0 indicates
that the agent in question does not increase the likelihood of acquiring
the disease-that the individual is just as likely to contract the
disease without exposure. Proof of a relative risk any greater than 1.0
is proof that the agent is capable of causing the disease in question,
and a relative risk of 2.0 indicates that exposure doubles an
30. Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 26, at 110 (noting that asbestosis-a unique injury
caused by exposure to asbestos-is an exception). This nonuniqueness means that adverse drug
reactions "ADRs" are difficult to recognize and to diagnose because of their similarity to other
disorders. See also Michel Auriche & Elizabeth Loupi, Does Proof of Causality Ever Exist in
Pharmacovigilance?, 9 DRUG SAFETY 230, 230 (1993); Nelson S. Irey, When Is a Disease Drug
Induced?, in PATHOLOGY OF DRUG-INDUCED AND ToxIc DISEASES 1, 2 (Robert H. Riddell ed.,
1982).
31. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Colo. 1998).
32. See, e.g., Pick v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (E.D. La. 1997).
1234 [Vol. 56:1227
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individual's risk of acquiring the disease. 33 A properly conducted
epidemiological study is considered relevant and reliable evidence of
general causation and is therefore admissible under the federal
standards established in Daubert.34  Other evidence of general
causation, albeit less conclusive than epidemiological studies, includes
case reports and toxicological studies of the drug in question or of
other drugs in the same class.
Proving specific causation can be more difficult, because the
relevant evidence is often scarce.35 Epidemiological evidence, although
extremely important as to the issue of general causation, has only
limited utility in proving specific causation.36 Accordingly, even if the
plaintiff produces reliable epidemiological evidence proving a relative
risk greater than 1.0, she must produce additional evidence of specific
causation. Differential diagnosis assumes its key role in making this
showing of specific causation. Testimony by a clinical physician that
he has considered all aspects of the specific plaintiffs injury, including
other possible causes of that injury, and concluded that the
defendant's product is the most likely cause of the injury-that is, that
the plaintiff most likely falls in Region C, as opposed to Region B-is
valuable evidence of specific causation.37 As such, the admissibility of
33. E.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990).
34. See Pick, 958 F. Supp. at 1158 (holding that "[e]pidemiological studies are reported in
peer-reviewed journals and the methodology is widely accepted as scientifically valid"); infra
Part II.B for a discussion of the Daubert framework.
35. Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 26, at 111.
36. Courts may, under certain circumstances, allow epidemiological studies alone to satisfy
the plaintiffs burden to prove specific causation, but only if the relative risk is at least 2.0. See,
e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that, as a
matter of relevance, the relative risk must be greater than 2.0); DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 958-59. To
explain the justification for the 2.0 requirement, refer to Figure 1. When the relative risk equals
2.0-i.e., when drug exposure exactly doubles the risk of contracting the disease-the exposed
population contains twice as many injured persons. As such, for any person randomly selected
from the exposed population, there is a fifty percent chance that drug exposure caused her
injury. In other words, there is a fifty percent chance that the plaintiff falls into Region C
(causation) and a fifty percent chance that the plaintiff falls into Region B (no causation). With
all being equal, because the usual standard of proof for tort causes of action is "more likely than
not," a relative risk of any greater than 2.0 will raise the likelihood of causation above fifty
percent, thereby satisfying the "more likely than not" standard. Usually, however, all else is not
equal. If, for example, epidemiological studies show that the relative risk is just over 2.0 but the
defendant introduces evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff has some other risk factor that is
a generally accepted alternative cause of her condition, a relative risk just over 2.0 is probably
insufficient for a jury finding on causation. Thus, epidemiological evidence has a limited ability
to carry the plaintiffs burden on specific causation.
37. Note the difference between evidence of specific causation and evidence of general
causation-as a general matter, evidence of general causation is any evidence derived from a
study of the drug, and evidence of specific causation is any evidence derived from a study of the
patient.
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differential diagnosis testimony often is critical to the success of the
plaintiffs claim.
38
The following section provides the basic legal framework-Rule
702 and the Supreme Court cases interpreting that Rule-for
evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony in federal trial courts.
B. The Daubert Standard
Rule 702 provides the standard according to which federal
courts evaluate the admissibility of all expert witness testimony:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
3 9
The Advisory Committee amended Rule 702 to incorporate the
admissibility standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.40 The Court's decision in
Daubert gave trial judges a "gatekeeping" role, requiring them to
exclude testimony that is unreliable or irrelevant. 41 As gatekeeper, the
trial judge must engage in "a preliminary assessment of whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be
applied to the facts at issue."4
2
Several years later, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner,43 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed Daubert and further explained the judge's
role as gatekeeper:
[Clonclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained
experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is
38. Sanders & Machal-Fulks, supra note 26, at 111.
39. FED. R. EVID. 702.
40. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
42. Id. at 592-93. Until the Supreme Court decided Daubert in 1993, the federal standard
for admissibility of expert testimony was that established by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in the 1923 case of Frye v. United States. 293 F. 1013, 1014
(D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye court established a test that has become known as the "general
acceptance test," and it required that the scientific principle at issue have achieved a level of
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community before an expert could testify as to that
matter in court. Id. The Frye general acceptance test remained undisturbed by the Federal Rules
of Evidence until the Supreme Court reconsidered the question in 1993 in an effort to clarify
confusion that had arisen among the lower federal courts as to whether Rule 702 superseded the
Frye general acceptance test. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
43. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
4 4
In Joiner, the plaintiff alleged that exposure to polychlorinated
biphenyls ("PCBs") caused, at least in part, his small-cell lung
cancer.45 The plaintiff offered expert witnesses to testify that animal
and epidemiological studies support a causal association between PCB
exposure and lung cancer.46 The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's exclusion of the expert testimony because the experts had
failed to explain their extrapolation from the studies to the conclusion
that PCBs contributed to the plaintiffs lung cancer.
47
As the Joiner Court stated, the federal admissibility standard
allows experts to arrive at conclusions through extrapolation from
existing data, as long as the gap between the data and their
conclusions is not "too great. '48 Several years later, in Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael,49 the Supreme Court explained the standard according
to which a court should evaluate the expert witness's analytical leap:
[Daubert's gatekeeping requirement] is to make certain that an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field.50
The Court held that a trial court's admissibility determination should
specifically take account of "the nature of the issue, the expert's
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. '51 In applying
the standard it articulated, the Court considered the tests used by
other experts in the relevant industry, concluded that these other
experts did not use the test that the plaintiffs expert witness used in
formulating his opinion (indeed, that the witness himself may not
have used that test in the course of his employment), and
consequently affirmed the district court's exclusion of the evidence.
52
Together, the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire opinions
provide the federal standard for admissibility of expert witness
testimony ("the Daubert standard"). The Daubert standard permits
federal courts to admit a broader range of expert testimony than the
standard it replaced but gives the court a very active role in screening
44. Id. at 146.
45. Id. at 139-40.
46. Id. at 143-46.
47. See id. at 144-45.
48. See id. at 146.
49. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
50. Id. at 152.
51. Id. at 150.
52. See id. at 157-58.
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that evidence for relevance and reliability.53 To cabin the liberalization
of admissibility standards that the Daubert Court announced,
however, the Court clarified that even if the trial judge admits the
evidence and the evidence later turns out to be insufficient to allow a
reasonable juror to find for the plaintiff as to that issue, the court
remains free to grant a motion for a directed verdict or summary
judgment. 54 The Court stated that "[t]hese conventional devices,
rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising 'general
acceptance' test, are the appropriate safeguards where the basis of
scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702."
55
C. Applying the Daubert Standard to Differential Diagnosis Evidence
As a general matter, the admissibility of differential diagnosis
evidence of causation is not seriously disputed.56 As the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated in Turner v. Iowa Fire
Equipment Co., "differential diagnosis is a tested methodology, has
been subjected to peer review/publication, does not frequently lead to
incorrect results, and is generally accepted in the medical
community."5 7 Indeed, most federal courts of appeals have held that a
reliable differential diagnosis is admissible evidence of causation.58
Although some commentators have suggested that certain courts
categorically exclude differential diagnosis testimony as proof of
causation because it is not scientific, 59 the cases cited for this
proposition consistently evince a willingness by courts to entertain
such testimony, provided the opinion is supported by sound scientific
methodology. 60 Disparate admissibility results therefore stem not from
53. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142.
54. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
55. Id.
56. FAIGMAN ETAL., supra note 5, § 20-1.4.1.
57. 229 F.3d 1202, 1208 (8th Cir. 2000) (summarizing prevailing court of appeals opinions).
58. See, e.g., id.; Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1999);
Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161
F.3d 1226, 1228-30 (9th Cir. 1998); Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F.3d 248, 252-
53 (1st Cir. 1998); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 385-87 (2d Cir. 1998); Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Glaser v. Thompson Med. Co., 32 F.3d 969,
978 (6th Cir. 1994).
59. See, e.g., Ned I. Miltenberg & Anthony Z. Roisman, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10980, 10981
(2002) (concluding that some courts view differential diagnosis testimony as an "illegitimate
nonscientific tool") (citing Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1999); Allen v.
Pa. Eng'g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1996); Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638,
649 (8th Cir. 1994)).
60. In Allen, for example, the court excluded the differential diagnosis evidence because the
evidence was either unreliable or insufficient to support the expert's opinion of a causal
association. See 102 F.3d at 197-99. And in Black, the court excluded the evidence because the
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an unwillingness to consider differential diagnosis evidence, but
rather from different understandings of what constitutes sound
scientific methodology.
In the context of a pharmaceutical product liability action,
Kumho Tire requires the judge to ensure that the witness's differential
diagnosis opinion is conducted with the same intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of a clinical physician in his everyday
diagnosis of adverse drug reactions.6 1 If he has met that standard, the
opinion should not be excluded as unreliable under the Daubert
standard. Before a judge can begin to determine whether an expert
has met that standard, however, he must have some idea of how
clinical physicians diagnose adverse drug reactions. The following part
details the methodology by which clinical physicians conduct
differential diagnoses of adverse drug reactions.
III. DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS
A. Differential Diagnosis in General
Dr. Richard C. Cabot remarked that differential diagnosis is "a
very dangerous topic-dangerous to the reputation of physicians for
wisdom."6 2 Cabot explained that it is very difficult to establish a set of
rules that reliably identify the condition from which the patient
suffers and excludes similar conditions. He remarked that physicians
are hesitant to "commit their thoughts to paper" and "suspicious of
any attempt to tabulate their methods of reasoning."63 The clinical
physician's reluctance to memorialize in writing his diagnostic
practices explains some of the difficulty inherent in the following
attempt to describe accurately the methodology by which clinical
physicians conduct differential diagnoses of adverse drug reactions.
Despite this difficulty, the Daubert framework requires courts to have
some understanding of the methodologies by which physicians conduct
differential diagnoses of adverse drug reactions.
As discussed above, differential diagnosis-also referred to as
"clinical medical evidence of causation"-is a process employed by
clinical physicians in everyday practice to determine the disease or
physician's only basis for the conclusion was his ruling out all other possible causes. See 171 F.3d
at 313-14.
61. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
62. A. McGEHEE HARVEY & JAMES BORDLEY, III, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS: THE
INTERPRETATION OF CLINICAL EVIDENCE 2 (2d ed. 1970) (quoting Dr. Cabot).
63. Id. (quoting Dr. Cabot).
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other condition from which a patient suffers. The crucial element of a
differential diagnosis is "selecting from a number of possibilities the
disease or diseases which come nearest to explaining the clinical and
laboratory findings in the case in question."64 In conducting this
differential diagnosis, physicians, after first detecting an abnormality,
try to match that abnormality with known diseases, develop an
interim diagnosis, and then make a final diagnosis. 65 For example, a
patient complaining of shortness of breath, a persistent cough, and
chest pain may suffer from, inter alia, lung cancer or bronchitis. The
process of determining which of these two conditions is affecting the
patient is the process of differential diagnosis.
The term "differential diagnosis," however, is also used to refer
to the process by which the physician, once he identifies the patient's
condition, for example lung cancer, determines the cause of that lung
cancer. As with differential diagnosis of a disease, clinicians
attempting to determine the cause of the disease make a list of
potential causal agents and, through a process of elimination, identify
the agent that remains on the list as the most likely cause of the
disease. For example, the physician attempting to identify the cause of
his patient's lung cancer may include both tobacco and asbestos
exposure on a list of possible causative agents. The process of
identifying the causal agent is properly termed "differential
etiology."66
B. Adverse Drug Reactions
The following explanation of the differential diagnosis
methodology focuses exclusively on the differential diagnosis of
adverse drug reactions, rather than on the process by which
physicians conduct differential diagnoses in general. The reason for
such specificity is the particular complexity of the diagnosis of adverse
drug reactions.
As alluded to above, the standard differential diagnosis is one
that identifies the most likely disease from a list of possible diseases.
When a clinician conducts such a differential diagnosis, he creates his
list of potential diseases from medical textbooks, medical treatises,
and his own experience as a diagnostician. 67 These sources help him
identify diseases commonly known to manifest themselves in the types
of symptoms that his patient has experienced. In other words, in many
64. Id. at 3.
65. JENNIFER J. JAMISON, DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS FOR PRIMARY PRACTICE 3-4 (1999).
66. See supra note 5.
67. See HARVEY & BORDLEY, supra note 62, at 3.
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differential diagnoses, the association, between the causal agent and
the disease is well established. The diagnosis of adverse drug
reactions is substantially more complex, however, precisely because
the association between the causal agent (the drug) and the disease is
not well established.
Many new drugs are approved by the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") and enter the market every year.68 Despite
the voluminous safety studies the FDA requires for each drug
presented for approval, 69 millions of adverse drug reactions 70 occur
every year, resulting in over 100,000 fatalities annually. 71 The
majority of these ADRs are not recognized before the drug is
approved. 72 The number of patients exposed to the drug in
premarketing clinical trials is simply too small to reveal some of the
more uncommon side effects.7 3 Variables such as age, gender, drug
interactions, genetic makeup, and preexisting diseases affect the
ability of a particular drug to produce a particular adverse reaction.
74
In fact, it is possible that a particular adverse drug reaction suffered
by one patient will not occur in any other patient. 75 Thus, new and
unexpected adverse drug reactions consistently arise as a result of the
many new drugs entering the market every year.7 6 Further, when the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is amended to tighten regulations for
drugs and medical devices, existing drugs and devices may be
"grandfathered"-that is, they may be exempt from certain safety and
68. See J.D. Kleinke & Scott Gottlieb, Is the FDA Approving Drugs Too Fast?, 317 BRIT.
MED. J. 899, 899 (1998) (stating that the FDA had recently been approving, on average, forty
new drugs per year); see generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CDER NEW AND GENERIC DRUG
APPROVALS: 1998-2002 (listing recent FDA drug approvals), at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/approval/index.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
69. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, NEW
DRUG APPLICATION (NDA) PROCESS (providing an overview of the new drug application process),
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applicationsNDA.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
70. The World Health Organization defines an adverse drug reaction "as any response to a
drug that is noxious and unintended" which occurs at prescription-level doses. Karch & Lasagna,
supra note 24, at 1236.
71. Funmilayo 0. Ajayi et al., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant Factors, 40 J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1093, 1093 (2000); Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug
Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-Analysis ofProspective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1203
tbl.4 (1998).
72. Ajayi et al., supra note 71, at 1094.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. Auriche & Loupi, supra note 30, at 231.
76. See id.
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efficacy studies required for the approval of new drugs and devices. 7
The grandfathering of existing drugs may also contribute to the high
incidence of adverse events in marketed drugs.
Because premarketing studies are incapable of determining all
adverse effects that might surface as the drug is prescribed to many
patients, the FDA also requires substantial postmarketing
surveillance for the drugs it approves. 78  If and when that
postmarketing surveillance data suggest that the harmful effects of
the drug outweigh its benefits, the product may be withdrawn from
the market, either by the FDA or by the manufacturer. 7
9
Withdrawal from the market, however, does not establish a
causal association between the drug and the patient's injury. Rather,
the FDA or the manufacturer may withdraw a product from the
market based on only a suspicion of its having deleterious side
effects.80 Even absent concrete evidence of a causal association,
however, clinical physicians must attempt to identify the cause of the
condition. In other words, they must determine whether the condition
is actually an adverse drug reaction. This causal assessment helps the
physician determine how to treat the patient's symptoms, whether to
cease drug treatment (in cases in which the drug has not been
withdrawn) and how to interrupt the progression of the disease.8' Yet
the information on which the physician bases this causal assessment
may be scant-perhaps the warning section of the drug label, a few
case reports of other patients who have suffered adverse reactions
while taking the drug, and some experience with drugs in a similar
class.
All of this suggests that when a physician diagnoses an adverse
drug reaction in his everyday practice of medicine, general
77. For example, when silicone gel breast implants were brought within the scope of the
FDCA in 1976, they were grandfathered, even though their safety had never been confirmed
through systematic studies. See ANGELL, supra note 19, at 21, 51.
78. Ajayi et al., supra note 71, at 1097 (noting the importance of postmarketing
surveillance). Ajayi and her co-authors estimate that two to three years of postmarketing
surveillance are required to obtain a good understanding of the range of adverse drug reactions
for a new drug. Id. at 1100.
79. See id. A recent well-known example involved the weight-loss drugs Redux and
Pondimin, withdrawn from the market on September 15, 1997 because of a possible association
with heart valve abnormalities. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. P97-32, FDA
ANNOUNCES WITHDRAWAL OF FENFLURAMINE AND DEXFENFLURAMINE (Sept. 15, 1997), available
at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topicsfNEWS/NEW00591.html. See generally FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
RECALLS/WITHDRAWALS (listing drugs recalled or withdrawn from the market), at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/recalls.htm (last modified Dec. 16, 2002).
80. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 79 (requesting that the
drug company voluntarily withdraw the drugs based on nothing more than a series of case
reports suggesting an association between the drugs and valvular abnormalities).
81. See Irey, supra note 30, at 1.
1242 [Vol. 56:1227
JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED
causation-i.e., whether the drug is capable of causing the patient's
condition-may not be established for relatively new drugs.
Accordingly, the physician cannot rely on a well-established body of
data collected in his textbooks, treatises, and prior experience to
develop his list. So what is he to do? He presumes, at least initially,
"that the drug is a possible factor in the adverse event until, after
weighing all the available evidence, a diagnosis is established."8 2 In
other words, with respect to the diagnosis of adverse drug reactions,
physicians do not "presume the innocence of the drug until proven
guilty beyond all reasonable doubt."8 3 Thus, the physician's approach
to the differential diagnosis of adverse drug reactions is markedly
different from his approach to the diagnosis of diseases with well-
classified lists of possible causes. The significance of this difference
will be discussed below in Part JV.8 4 For now it is sufficient to note the
difference as the reason that the following discussion focuses
specifically on the differential diagnosis of adverse drug reactions,
rather than on the process of differential diagnosis in general.
C. Approaches to the Diagnosis of ADRs
As Danan and Benichou point out, "assessing the causal role of
a drug in the occurrence of an adverse medical event remains one of
the most controversial issues."8 5 This controversy has led to the
development of varying approaches to the differential diagnosis of
adverse drug reactions. These approaches fall into three general
categories: clinical judgment, quantitative algorithms, and the
Bayesian approach.8 6 Within each category there is tremendous
variety. The remainder of this section explains each methodology
using some paradigmatic examples as illustrations of each approach.
8 7
82. M.D.B. Stephens, The Diagnosis of Adverse Medical Events Associated with Drug
Treatment, 1 ADVERSE DRUG REACTION AC. POISON. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
83. Id. at 1 (internal quotations omitted).
84. See discussion infra Part IV.
85. Gaby Danan & Christian Benichou, Causality Assessment of Adverse Reactions to
Drugs-I. A Novel Method Based on the Conclusions of International Consensus Meetings:
Application to Drug-Induced Liver Injuries, 46 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1323, 1323 (1993). For
example, M.D.B. Stephens points out that between 1972 and 1986 alone, eighteen new methods
for assessing adverse drug event reports were proposed. Stephens, supra note 82, at 4.
86. See Krista L. Lanct6t & Claudio A. Naranjo, Pharmacoepidemiology and Drug
Utilization: Comparison of the Bayesian Approach and a Simple Algorithm for Assessment of
Adverse Drug Events, 58 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 692, 692 (1995); C.A.
Naranjo et al., A Method for Estimating the Probability of Adverse Drug Reactions, 30 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 239, 239 (1981).
87. Note that there are at least three different groups of physicians who diagnose adverse
drug events: clinical physicians-i.e., those who treat patients; physicians working on behalf of
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1. Clinical Judgment (Global Introspection) and Qualitative
Algorithms
The clinical judgment approach, also known as "global
introspection,"8 8 is the most traditional and common methodology for
the differential diagnosis of adverse drug reactions.8 9  This
methodology is based on a variety of data that the doctor subjectively
factors into an assessment of the cause of a patient's condition.90 One
physician describes the method of global introspection as follows:
The assessor attempts to consider each factor that could possibly affect the causal link
between one or more administered drugs and a subsequently observed adverse event.
He or she makes a mental list of these factors, weighs them according to some sense of
their relative importance, mixes the complicated brew in a fashion somewhat
reminiscent of the witches in Macbeth, and then spews forth a decision about the
probability of drug causation.
9 1
In general, this assessment is largely a matter of "inner
conviction" as to whether or not the sum of these factors amounts to
causation.92 Indeed, according to one expert, "it is all a matter of
opinion. '93 Studies confirm the disparity among physicians' causality
assessments of the same cases. 94 For example, a 1976 study compared
the independently developed opinions of three clinical pharmacologists
as to whether or not sixty patients had suffered an adverse drug
reaction. 95 The three clinical pharmacologists agreed on only thirty of
the sixty cases. 96 Of the remaining thirty cases, nineteen involved
major disagreement-for example, when one pharmacologist found a
definite ADR and the other definitely concluded that no ADR had
occurred. 9
7
administrative agencies; and physicians in the pharmaceutical industry. Stephens, supra note
82, at 5. These groups diagnose adverse drug reactions for different reasons-ranging from
treatment of patients to monitoring drug safety-and the precise method varies slightly
according to the purpose. See id.
88. See, e.g., Michael S. Kramer, Assessing Causality of Adverse Drug Reactions: Global
Introspection and Its Limitations, 20 DRUG INFO. J. 433, 433 (1986).
89. Lanct6t & Naranjo, supra note 86, at 692.
90. Michael S. Kramer, Assessing Causality of Adverse Drug Reactions: Global Introspection
and Its Limitations, 20 DRUG INFO. J. 433, 433 (1986).
91. Id.
92. Auriche & Loupi, supra note 30, at 231.
93. Stephens, supra note 82, at 2.
94. See, e.g., Auriche & Loupi, supra note 30, at 231.
95. Fred E. Karch et al., Commentary: Adverse Drug Reactions-A Matter of Opinion, 19
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 489, 489 (1976).
96. Id. at 491.
97. Id.
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The highly subjective and imprecise nature of the clinical
judgment approach 98 led to efforts to develop operational definitions
for the diagnosis of adverse drug reactions. 99 These operational
definitions, or qualitative algorithms, produce greater consistency
among diagnosticians than the clinical judgment approach itself,
which involves little in the way of articulable criteria or standards.
The operational definitions, however, are intended to approximate the
general calculus performed by physicians in the course of a differential
diagnosis based on clinical judgment. The first operational definition
of ADR diagnosis was developed by Nelson Irey.100
According to Irey, at the first step of any method of ADR
diagnosis, the physician must determine whether a particular drug is
an eligible cause of the symptoms the patient experiences. 10 1 Although
there is no single standard according to which all physicians will
consider an adverse drug reaction an "eligible" cause, the threshold for
inclusion of the drug as a potential factor generally is quite low. For
example, Irey suggests that a drug is an eligible cause of the adverse
event when the clinician confirms by the drug label that the drug
ordered is the drug the patient received ("identification"), that the
patient took the drug as ordered ("administration"), that ADR onset
followed drug administration ("temporal eligibility"), and that the
interval between initial exposure to the drug and onset of the adverse
reaction is reasonable for that particular drug ("latent period").
10 2
Essentially, as Stephens has suggested, when a patient experiences
any symptoms after administration of a drug, the physician should
presume the involvement of that drug in causing those symptoms
until he definitively establishes a proper diagnosis.
103
After an adverse drug reaction is deemed eligible, the physician
attempts to confirm or to deny a possible causal association.10 4 Six
other factors help the physician to confirm the causal association:
exclusion, de-challenge, re-challenge, singularity of the drug, pattern,
and drug identification (both quantitative and qualitative). 
10 5
"Exclusion" refers to the process by which other possible drug causes
98. See id. at 492.
99. See, e.g., Karch & Lasagna, supra note 24, at 1237.
100. Stephens, supra note 82, at 5.
101. See Nelson S. Irey, Tissue Reactions to Drugs, 82 AM. J. PATHOLOGY 617, 622 (1976).
102. Id. at 622-24. The latent period is a unique characteristic of each drug and may also
vary from patient to patient. Irey, supra note 30, at 4.
103. Stephens, supra note 82, at 2.




are eliminated.106 "De-challenge" is the process by which the patient is
taken off the suspected drug for the purpose of observing whether the
adverse drug event ceases and is reversible. 10 7 Following de-challenge,
"re-challenge" is the process of reexposure to the drug to determine if
the adverse drug reaction resumes.108 When a physician evaluates the
"singularity of the drug," he considers whether the patient was
exposed to only one drug when the adverse event occurred, as well as
whether any other disease or condition from which the patient suffers
could have caused the adverse event. 10 9 "Pattern" refers to either
precedent in the literature 10 or previous clinical experience with the
drug or other drugs in its class indicating an association between the
drug and the adverse event in question."' "Drug quantitation" is the
process of determining the level of the drug in the body fluids and is
most helpful in overdose cases." 2 Finally, "drug qualitation" refers to
an analysis of the body fluids for the mere presence of a drug. 113
Clearly, much subjectivity enters the physician's analysis of
each of these factors. Similarly, determining how each of these
individual factors fits with the others to produce a final causal
determination involves a great deal of subjectivity. The next step of
Irey's operational model is therefore to apply each of these factors to a
set of causality criteria." 4 Each of Irey's five degrees of causality-
causative, probable, possible, coincidental, or negative-defines the
quantum of evidence required for a causality assessment to that
particular degree of certainty." 5
According to Irey's model, a finding of "causative" requires drug
eligibility, 1 6 singularity of the drug, a known drug response pattern
consistent with the observed event, and elimination of any preexisting
106. Id. at 5. Exclusion is often represented as a time-flow chart, employing time
relationships to eliminate other drug causes. Id. at 6.
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id. Of course, doctors are often reluctant to conduct a re-challenge experiment when the
adverse drug event is serious and the drug is most likely responsible. Id.
109. Id. at 7. Irey notes that when all other nondrug causes can be ruled out and there is a
well-established association between the condition and the drug, the diagnosis is relatively
straightforward. See id.
110. Examples include case reports, epidemiological studies, and toxicological studies.
111. Irey, supra note 30, at 7.
112. Id. at 8; Irey, supra note 101, at 632. In cases of death, toxicologic screening may help to
eliminate other possible drugs, for example, drugs that were present at levels insufficient to be
lethal. Irey, supra note 30, at 8-9.
113. Irey, supra note 30, at 9.
114. See Irey, supra note 101, at 636-44.
115. See id.
116. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text.
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diseases as an explanation of the event.' 17 A finding that the drug was
a "probable" cause of the adverse event requires that all of the same
criteria except singularity of the drug be met, but at least one of the
other six factors must be satisfied in its stead.118
Irey considers the drug a "possible" cause of the adverse event
in one of three situations. 119 First, all of the criteria for "probable"
have been established, but other potential drug causes cannot be ruled
out.120 Second, most of the criteria for a "probable" diagnosis are met,
but data are unavailable to establish all the relevant criteria.
121
Finally, all of the criteria for a "probable" diagnosis have been
established, but the literature has not yet described the pattern of this
drug.122 According to Irey, "[w]hen such a case may constitute a new,
emergent entity, it is put in the 'possible' category, awaiting further
confirmatory experience or a more extensive search of the
literature."'123 The "coincidental" category includes those cases in
which the patient was exposed to the drug, but either the drug is
ineligible or there is a viable alternate cause for the event. 124 Finally,
Irey characterizes the causal association as "negative" when
laboratory studies exclude the drug as a possible cause.125
Various other models defining degrees of causality have been
offered since the development of Irey's operational model. 126 These
attempts at categorization vary dramatically, however. In particular,
Lanct6t and Naranjo suggest that these unquantified approaches
produce high rates of disagreement among diagnosticians in particular
cases, stating that "one expert's 'probable' could be equivalent to
another expert's 'possible.' "127 Thus, even with the operational
117. Irey, supra note 101, at 637-38. Irey has suggested that the "causative" category is so
rarely satisfied that it is usually reserved for those cases involving overdose, where the evidence
is primarily a report of a lethal drug level in body fluids and/or tissues. Irey, Drug Induced,
supra note 30, at 12.
118. Irey, supra note 101, at 638-39.
119. Id. at 639-40.
120. Id. at 639.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 640.
123. Irey, supra note 30, at 14.
124. Irey, supra note 101, at 640-41.
125. Id. at 641-42.
126. See, e.g., Karch & Lasagna, supra note 24, at 1237 (describing the operational
definitions first offered by the Registry of Tissue Reactions to Drugs).
127. Lanct6t & Naranjo, supra note 86, at 692-93. Indeed, where Irey requires the adverse
event to follow a known response pattern of the drug for categorization as "probable," but not
"possible," see supra note 118 and accompanying text, Karch and Lasagna require a known
response pattern for either category. Karch & Lasagna, supra note 24, at 1237. Where "possible"
differs from "probable" in their categorization is that a "possible" causal association cannot rule
out alternative causes. Id.
20031 1247
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
definitions, physicians' causality assessments are not consistently
replicable. This reproducibility problem with the clinical judgment
approach and other qualitative models led to the development of
quantitative methods for diagnosing adverse drug reactions.
2. Quantitative Algorithms
Quantitative algorithms are a second method of assessing
adverse drug reactions. 128 These algorithms were not developed to
change the substance of the causal assessment. Instead, they were
designed to quantify the relative importance of the factors in a way
that would reflect what clinicians had been doing subjectively but
would produce more consistent results. 129
An algorithm is a series of questions relating to the various
factors that a doctor considers in his analysis of a potential adverse
drug event. 30 Associated with each question is a weight that varies
according to the answer given and the relative importance of that
particular factor in the overall causality assessment.131 Many different
algorithms have been developed to assess adverse drug reactions. 32
To illustrate the function of an algorithm, this section describes
the twenty-three question algorithm developed by Venulet.' 33 The first
step of the Venulet algorithm is to answer the following twenty-three
questions:
128. Lanct6t & Naranjo, supra note 86, at 692-93.
129. See id. at 693.
130. See, e.g., id.
131. See, e.g., id.
132. For example, the Adverse Drug Reaction Probability Scale ("APS") is a simple algorithm
consisting of a ten-question questionnaire, taking account of the following factors: pattern of
response (which refers to previous conclusive reports on the reaction), temporal sequence, de-
challenge, re-challenge, alternative causes, placebo response, drug levels in body fluids or
tissues, dose-response relationship, experiences of previous patients with the drug, and
confirmation by objective evidence. Naranjo et al., supra note 86, at 240. The FDA has also
developed a simple algorithm for causality assessment based on case reports. See Judith K.
Jones, Determining Causation from Case Reports, in PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY 275, 282 (Brian L.
Strom ed., 1989); see also Danan & Benichou, supra note 85, at 1325-27 (describing a new
algorithm for causality assessment); Michael S. Kramer et al., An Algorithm for the Operational
Assessment of Adverse Drug Reactions, 242 JAMA 623, 624-29 (1979).
133. J. Venulet et al., Updating of a Method for Causality Assessment of Adverse Drug
Reactions, 24 INT'L. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY, THERAPY & TOXICOLOGY 559, 560 (1986).
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Figure 2. Twenty-Three Question Venulet Algorithm134
Encircle One
All questions refer to the Suspected Drug or in case Known Yes No Unk
of Interactions to both Drugs
I. History of present adverse reaction
1. Dose or duration of treatment exceeded? Yes No Unk.
(as per 'Basis Text")
2. Drug given prior to event? (asper dates) Yes No Unk.
3. Concomitant or preceding drug therapy? Yes No Unk.
4. Reaction at site of application? Yes No Unk.
5. ADR immediately follows the drug? (within approx. 1 hour) Yes No Unk.
6. Dechallenge positive? (fADR reversible) Known Yes No Unk.
(vithout treatment with treatment = Y).
7. Rechallenge positive? Yes No Unk.
8. Were concomitant drugs stopped at the same time? Yes No Unk.
(on# if3= Y
II. Patient's past adverse reaction history
9. Same ADR to this drug before? Yes No Unk.
10. Other ADR to this drug before? Yes No Unk.
11. Similar symptoms in the past? (not related to drug treatment) Yes No Unk.
12. Similar ADR with other drugs in the past? Yes No Unk.
III. Monitor's experience
13. Drug/ADR interval compatible with event? Known Yes No Unk.
( ypical = K; Conpalible = Y, Incompaible = N)
14. Adverse event of rare spontaneous occurrence? Yes No Unk.
(Yor N only)
15. Similar events known to occur with the disease treated Yes No Unk.
or with concomitant disease(s)?
16. ADR occurrence facilitated by the disease treated Yes No Unk.
by concomitant diseases?
17. Contributory role of non-drug therapies? Yes No Unk.
18. Other contributory factors (habits, environment, etc.)? Yes No Unk.
19. ADR known with the suspected drug? Known Yes No Unk.
(K, Y or N only) (known = K; suspected = Y)
20. ADR explainable by the biological properties of the drug? Yes No Unk.
(only if 19 = N)
21. ADR known with pharmacologically-related drugs? Yes No Unk.
(only if 19 = N)
22. ADR known with concomitant or preceding drug therapy? Known Yes No Unk.
(only if3 = Y; ifwell known = K)
23. Drug interaction as a possible cause of ADR (only if3 = Y) Yes No Unk.
134. Reproduced from Venulet's article. Id.
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As this figure demonstrates, most questions are answered as
yes, no, or unknown. An answer of known is used only when an
answer other than yes, no, or unknown is called for (as explained in
the parentheticals following that particular question).
Many of these questions can be grouped in classes that
correspond to the factors clinicians utilize in the qualitative
approaches to ADR diagnosis. Questions 2, 5, and 13 refer to temporal
association and latent period. Questions 3, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18,
and 22 refer to alternative causes or contributory factors such as
diseases, other drugs, or environmental factors. Question 19 is the
question that most specifically addresses the issue of general
causation-i.e., whether or not the drug is capable of causing the
adverse event-and accounts for the same type of information that
Irey's approach referred to as the drug's response pattern. 135 With
respect to question 19, Venulet suggests that a drug falls into the
suspected category-the "yes" answer-if the adverse event has been
reported in association with the drug only several times. 136 The
reaction is considered "known" only when the causal relationship has
been proven or when the occurrence of the adverse reaction with the
drug is generally accepted." 137 Questions 20 and 21-generally only
important if the answer to Question 19 is "no"13 8 -refer to whether the
physician can explain the adverse event based upon the properties of
the suspected drug or a pharmacologically related drug. Question 6
involves the patient's response to de-challenge, and Question 7
involves her response to re-challenge.
After the diagnostician answers each of these questions, each
answer is assigned a weight ranking commensurate with its probative
value. 139 For example, according to Venulet, the most probative of the
twenty-three categories of evidence-a positive re-challenge-is worth
+30 points, while a negative re-challenge is worth -25.140 A known
response pattern is worth +10, a suspected response pattern is worth
+5, and an unknown response pattern is worth -5.141 When all of the
135. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
136. Venulet et al., supra note 133, at 562.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally id. at 564-65 (charts assigning weight to each category). Note also that
there is another level of categorization that has been omitted form this discussion for the purpose
of simplicity. This category involves classifying the reaction as dose-related or unrelated,
whether the reaction occurs only on drug withdrawal, whether the reaction is a result of
addiction to the drug, etc. See id. at 563. By and large, the assignment of weight to each answer
is the same regardless of this categorization. See id. at 564-65.
140. See id. at 564.
141. See id.
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answers have been assigned a weight value, the values are totaled and
compared to a causality level. 142 Seventy points results in a "definite"
causal association, 40 to 65 is "probable," 5 to 35 is "possible," -15 to 0
is "unlikely," and less than -30 is "unrelated."143
Only two of the twenty-three questions can result in answers
that are dispositive of the causal assessment. If the answer to either
Question 2-whether the drug was given prior to the event (temporal
proximity)-or Question 13-whether the drug/ADR interval is
compatible with the event (appropriate latency period-is no, then
that answer requires a conclusion of not related. 144 No other answer,
including an unknown response pattern, is dispositive of the
diagnosis. 145
3. The Bayesian Approach
A third method of differential diagnosis of adverse drug
reactions is the Bayesian approach. 146 The B3ayesian approach is the
most recently developed methodology for assessing adverse drug
reactions. The underlying premise is a statement of probability known
as the Bayes Theorem. 147 The Bayesian approach compares the
probability of an adverse event occurring after drug exposure to the
probability of the event occurring without drug exposure. 148
The calculation involves evaluating the patient's history, the
temporal proximity between exposure to the drug and the onset of
symptoms, results of de-challenge and re-challenge experiments, the
epidemiology of the suspected drug, and any other relevant factors. 49
These factors are separated into two groups-prior odds, a measure
which accounts for information known about the particular adverse
event (e.g., epidemiological studies), and likelihood ratios, a measure
which accounts for information about the patient's case (e.g., time of
142. See id. at 566.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 564-65. This process is consistent with Irey's operational model, according to
which a drug is not considered an "eligible" cause absent temporal proximity and a reasonable
latency period. See discussion supra Part III.C. 1.
145. Note, however, that not all algorithms consider a lack of temporal proximity and an
unreasonable latency period as dispositive of the outcome. See., e.g., Naranjo et al., supra note
86, at 240 tbl.1 (describing an algorithm according to which an adverse event appearing before
drug administration results in a subtraction of one point from the total score, rather than a
conclusive finding that the drug and the adverse event are unrelated).
146. See Lanct6t & Naranjo, supra note 86, at 692.
147. Judith K. Jones, A Bayesian Approach to Causality Assessment, 23
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY BULL. 395, 396 (1987).
148. Jones, supra note 132, at 283.
149. Id.
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onset).150 The product of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio is the
posterior odds, 151 expressed in terms of a posterior probability, a figure
that ranges from 0% (not drug related) to 100% (definitely drug
related). 152 The Bayesian methodology is more complicated in its
execution, but this simplified description suffices for this discussion.153
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing discussion of the methodology by which clinical
physicians conduct differential diagnoses of adverse drug reactions
demonstrates the absence of a single method according to which
physicians assess the causal association between a drug and an
adverse reaction. Nonetheless, there are several implications of this
discussion that are relevant to a court's consideration of the reliability
of an expert witness's differential diagnosis opinion. To examine these
implications, it is useful to consider a representative case.
In Glastetter v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that the
testimony from the plaintiffs expert witness on causation was not
sufficiently reliable and therefore was inadmissible.1 5 4 Plaintiff Tina
Glastetter was prescribed the drug Parlodel, manufactured by the
defendant Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, for the prevention
of postpartum lactation.1 55 After thirteen days of Parlodel treatment,
she suffered symptoms and was diagnosed with an intracerebral
hemorrhage that resulted in a stroke.
156
The plaintiff sought to prove by expert testimony that
bromocriptine mesylate, the active ingredient in Parlodel, caused her
intracerebral hemorrhage.15 7 Both experts relied on differential
diagnosis methodology to form their opinion that Parlodel caused the
plaintiffs stroke.158 At the pretrial Daubert hearing, the two experts
testified that they considered case reports, animal studies,
epidemiological studies, characteristics of drugs in the same family as
Parlodel, the plaintiffs medical records, evidence of temporal
150. Naranjo et al., Advances in the Diagnosis of Adverse Drug Reactions, 32 J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 897, 901 (1992).
151. Id.
152. Lanct6t & Naranjo, Comparison, supra note 86, at 693.
153. For further discussion of the Bayesian methodology, see generally Jones, supra note
147.
154. 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2000), affd, 252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001).
155. Id. at 1017.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1019.
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proximity, and possible alternative causes such as other diseases,
conditions, or external factors.
159
In evaluating the opinion of one of the plaintiffs experts, the
court explicitly stated that because the physician's differential
diagnoses opinion was not based on scientific studies, it was "in the
final analysis, reposed in the realm of 'may cause' or 'possibly could
cause.' "160 Further, with respect to both experts, the Glastetter court
concluded that both opinions were unreliable because the experts did
not come forward with evidence "ruling in" Parlodel as a possible
cause of intracerebral hemorrhage. 16' By "ruling in" the drug as a
possible cause, the court was referring to the issue of general
causation-i.e., whether the drug is capable of causing the alleged
injury.162 The court suggested that a differential diagnosis opinion on
causation is unreliable whenever that expert has not also formed an
opinion, based on scientific studies, on general causation. 6 3
This requirement-that a differential diagnosis expert
demonstrate how he has "ruled in" the drug at issue as a potential
cause-has been adopted in several other recent cases.' 64 The
purported reason for this requirement is to ensure that the causal
agent that remains on the list after everything else has been ruled out
is actually capable of producing the adverse event. 65 With this
discussion in mind, the following two sections consider the
permissibility and utility of a "ruling in" requirement.
A. The "Ruling In" Requirement: Reliability
The Court in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael prescribed that courts
hold expert witness analyses to "the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field."1 66 As
such, in considering whether a differential diagnosis expert should be
held to an absolute "ruling in" requirement when offering testimony
on specific causation, the court must compare the witness's analytic
159. See generally id. at 1019-31 (describing the experts' differential diagnosis methodology).
160. Id. at 1025.
161. Id. at 1028.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir. 2002);
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff'd, Rider v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002); In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d
1217, 1230 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1412-13 (D. Or.
1996); Cavallo v. Star Enter., 892 F. Supp. 756, 771 (E.D. Va. 1995).
165. See, e.g., Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63 (quoting Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1413).
166. 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.
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process to the process employed by clinical physicians in their
everyday practice of medicine. 167 That comparative analysis leads to
the following inescapable conclusion: Clinical physicians, with respect
to the differential diagnosis of adverse drug reactions, neither assume
general causation nor require evidence of general causation before
they consider a drug a possible cause of an adverse event.
168
Accordingly, courts should not require a differential diagnosis expert
to present evidence of general causation as a condition of admissibility
under Daubert.
Regardless of the methodology used, a properly conducted
differential diagnosis is multifactored. 169 The factors involved in any
ADR diagnosis are essentially the same. They are as follows: temporal
association; response pattern of the drug;170 de-challenge; re-challenge;
and exclusion of other possible drugs, toxins, conditions, and diseases
as alternative causes. 171 Where the three approaches diverge is in the
methodology by which each determines the degree of certainty of the
diagnosis-specifically, a judgment made by a clinical physician after
taking account all of the factors, a methodological evaluation pursuant
to some quantitative algorithm, or a calculation based on a Bayesian
equation.
72
Although the approaches are multifactored, several of those
factors may be dispositive. Both Irey and Venulet suggest that if the
adverse event occurred before the drug was taken (temporal
proximity), or if the period between exposure and the adverse event is
inconsistent with a known latency period for that adverse drug event,
the conclusion must be that the adverse event is unrelated to drug
exposure. 73 Otherwise, however, once temporal proximity and latent
period confirm the drug's eligibility, there is no consensus as to any
167. See 526 U.S. at 157 (considering the type of tests used by other tire experts in its
evaluation under Daubert of the witness's conclusion that a tire defect caused the tire to blow
out).
168. See discussion supra Parts III.B-C. But see, e.g., Hall, 947 F. Supp. at 1413
("[D]ifferential diagnosis assumes that general causation has been proven for the list of possible
causes it eliminates."). Such an assumption may be appropriate for the differential diagnosis of a
disease, but for the reasons stated above regarding the specific problems associated with the
differential diagnosis of adverse drug reactions, and as the foregoing discussion demonstrates,
this assumption does not hold true for the differential diagnosis of ADRs. See discussion supra
Part II.B.
169. See generally discussion supra Part III.C (describing the primary approaches to ADR
differential diagnosis).
170. Examples include epidemiological studies, case reports, and toxicological tudies.
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single dispositive factor in the diagnosis of adverse drug reactions. 7 4
The importance of each factor depends on which of the three
approaches is taken, the particular operational model, algorithm, or
equation that is used, and the physician who applies it.
175
One of the nondispositive factors in a clinician's differential
diagnosis is the response pattern of the drug. 176 Not only is an
unknown response pattern not dispositive of the physician's causality
assessment, but other factors in the assessment may be much stronger
evidence of specific causation than whether or not the drug has a
known response pattern. 177 For example, where Venulet gives
evidence of positive re-challenge thirty points of the forty points
necessary for a finding of probable causation, he gives evidence of a
known response pattern only ten points. 78 Thus, a physician can
reliably base an ADR diagnosis on several of these other factors
without any evidence of general causation. For example, if a new drug
is introduced in the market, a number of serious adverse events are
immediately reported, the drug is withdrawn, and no subsequent
controlled epidemiological studies are performed because of the
withdrawal, the physician has little or no basis for a conclusion as to
general causation. Yet that physician still may reliably base a positive
ADR diagnosis on positive results on de-challenge, positive results on
re-challenge, temporal evidence, a consistent latent period, and
exclusion of all other possible causes. Thus, despite the lack of
evidence of general causation, according to the diagnostic constructs
examined above, the physician may have more than sufficient
evidence upon which to reliably base a conclusion that the drug caused
his patient's injury.
Evidence of the drug's response pattern is tantamount to
evidence of general causation-that is, evidence that "rules in" the
drug as a possible cause-because, as explained above, evidence of a
response pattern includes either precedent in the literature or
previous clinical experience with the drug or other drugs in its class.1
79
Accordingly, if an unknown drug response pattern is not necessarily
dispositive of the clinician's diagnostic assessment (and since evidence
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See supra note 111 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part III.C.2 (listing
the factors in the Venulet algorithm, one of which is the known response pattern of the drug).
Note that some ADR differential diagnosis methods do not consider whether the association
between the drug and the adverse event has been previously recognized. See, e.g., Jones, supra
note 147, at 395.
177. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
178. See Venulet et al., supra note 133, at 564.
179. E.g., Irey, supra note 30, at 7.
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of a drug's response pattern is roughly equivalent to the general
causation and to the "ruling in" requirement), then Kumho Tire
provides that the absence of evidence "ruling in" the drug as a possible
cause should not be dispositive of a court's Daubert analysis. Whether
the suspected agent is actually capable of causing the patient's disease
is simply not one that the differential diagnosis process is designed
specifically to answer.
80
Courts that improperly condition the admissibility of
differential diagnosis testimony on evidence that the expert has "ruled
in" the drug as a possible cause appear to do so for one of two reasons.
First, some courts fail to recognize the importance of Kumho Tire to
the consideration of this "ruling in" requirement. For example, in
Siharath v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., the district court excluded
the plaintiffs expert's differential diagnosis testimony under the
reliability prong of Daubert while admitting that "[t]he Court also does
not question that the methodology Dr. Kulig discussed at the Daubert
hearing serves him well every day in the clinical practice of
medicine."'' The Siharath court further suggests that even the best
clinical methodology available does not satisfy the requirement of
Daubert.18 2 This approach is flatly inconsistent with the Kumho Tire
Court's explication of the Daubert reliability prong, which defines
reliability according to the consistency of the expert's analytical
process with that of other experts in his field. Second, other courts
misunderstand the clinical practice of differential diagnosis. For
example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, affirming
Glastetter, defined differential diagnosis as the process by which "a
physician . . . 'rul[es] in' all scientifically plausible causes of the
plaintiffs injury ... [and] then 'rules out' the least possible causes of
injury until the most likely cause remains."18 3 As illustrated by the
foregoing discussion of the clinical process of differential diagnosis,
this conception of differential diagnosis, at least with respect to the
180. Differential diagnosis experts, recognizing the difference between general and specific
causation, do not represent that their diagnoses are intended to prove general causation, and
they explicitly state in some cases that differential diagnoses are not designed for that purpose.
See, e.g., Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2000), affld,
252 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001). For example, the court in Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., after
stating that the "ruling in" question is one of general causation, notes that general causation is a
question of epidemiology or toxicology, not clinical medicine. 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1362-63 (N.D.
Ga. 2001), affd, Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, an
expert called to testify as to specific causation based on a differential diagnosis cannot be
expected to provide evidence of general causation.
181. Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
182. See id.
183. Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 989; see also Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193,
1209-10 (10th Cir. 2002).
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differential diagnosis of adverse drug-reactions, is incorrect.18 4 Either
way, courts such as those deciding Siharath and Glastetter are
effectively converting an otherwise relatively minor factor in a
clinician's causality assessment into the dispositive requirement of the
court's Daubert determination.
Some courts also hold experts to an inappropriately high
standard with respect to other factors in the multifactored differential
diagnosis analysis. For example, some courts have expressly stated
that a differential diagnosis expert must rule out other potential
causes before he can offer his opinion that the defendant's product
caused the plaintiffs injury.18 5 However, just as evidence of a known
response pattern is only one of a series of nondispositive factors in the
physician's diagnostic consideration, so too is exclusion of diseases,
conditions, or other external factors as alternative causes. 186 Only if
the expert "utterly fails to consider alternative causes or fails to offer
an explanation for why the proffered alternative cause was not the
sole cause," should the testimony be excluded as unreliable under
Daubert.8
7
The message here is simple: When a court evaluates the
reliability of clinical medical evidence of causation, the expert's
inability to offer evidence that any single causal criterion supports his
opinion-namely, evidence of general causation-should not render an
expert opinion unreliable under the Daubert standard.
B. The "Ruling In" Requirement: Sufficiency
Although a differential diagnosis opinion that is not based at
least in part on evidence of general causation may be reliable and
admissible under Daubert, that opinion may be insufficient to allow
reasonable jurors to conclude that the drug caused the patient's
injury. It is important to note at the outset of this discussion that the
question of sufficiency is a question of substantive law, and, under
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 88 is determined by the law of the
184. Note that the stated definition would be correct if by "ruling in all scientifically
plausible causes of the plaintiffs injury," these courts acknowledged that clinicians
presumptively "rule in" an eligible drug as a possible cause. See supra notes 82-83 and
accompanying text. Instead, courts equate the "ruling in" requirement with evidence of general
causation.
185. See Glastetter, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1027; Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63; Hall v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996).
186. See discussion supra Part III.C.
187. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Westberry v.
Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1999)).
188. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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forum state when a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction. As such,
exactly how far a particular differential diagnosis goes toward meeting
the plaintiffs burden is a matter of state law, 8 9 and state law varies
considerably with respect to the quantum of evidence required to
support a finding of causation. 190
That said, the general rule across jurisdictions is that
satisfaction of the causation element requires evidence of both general
and specific causation. 191 The plaintiff must first prove that, as a
general matter, the drug is capable of causing the observed adverse
event and then must prove through evidence specific to the plaintiff
that the drug is the most likely cause of the plaintiffs observed
adverse event. 192 A reliable differential diagnosis provides the latter
type of evidence, but it does not necessarily provide the former. Many
times, however, the plaintiff offers a differential diagnosis expert
without any other expert witnesses, such as an epidemiological expert,
to provide evidence of general causation. Thus, even if a jury were to
conclude after hearing all of the evidence that the plaintiffs
differential diagnosis expert has offered credible evidence of specific
causation, the jury still cannot return a verdict for the plaintiff
because the plaintiff has offered no evidence of general causation.
Courts should not resolve this problem, however, by excluding
the differential diagnosis as unreliable. The evidence is not unreliable;
it is merely insufficient to allow reasonable jurors to conclude that the
defendant's product caused the plaintiffs injury. 193  Because
substantive law requires the plaintiff to prove general causation,
evidence capable of establishing only specific causation is always
insufficient to carry the plaintiffs entire burden on causation.
Although reliable, a differential diagnosis that stands by itself as to
the causation element and that lacks evidence of general causation
does not go very far in satisfying the legal element of causation.
Simply put, a differential diagnosis that does not "rule in" the drug as
a possible cause-because of the legal requirement of general
causation-cannot help a jury issue a verdict for the plaintiff as much
189. See, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Pharm. Inc., 104 F.3d 1371, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
190. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, When Daubert Gets Erie: Medical Certainty and
Medical Expert Testimony in Federal Court, 77 DENVER U. L. REV 69, 71-77 (1999) (describing
varying state law standards granting expert evidence of medical causation).
191. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
193. Some courts also suggest that differential diagnosis evidence, when not supplemented
by evidence of general causation, is excludable under Daubert because it is irrelevant. See In re
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1229-39 (D. Colo. 1998); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Colo. 1996); see also Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129,
145 (6th Cir. 1994) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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as it can help a physician diagnose a patient with an ADR. A reliable
differential diagnosis may simply be insufficient in light of the
substantive law's general causation requirement. As such, the judge
may grant the defendant's summary judgment motion. Accordingly,
differential diagnosis opinions that do not provide evidence of general
causation, while not necessarily unreliable under Daubert, may still be
excluded if those opinions constitute the sum total of the plaintiffs
causation evidence.
Conversely, a reliable ADR differential diagnosis, standing
alone, may under some circumstances (and depending on the
applicable substantive law) constitute reliable, relevant, and sufficient
evidence of causation. The process of ADR differential diagnosis,
contrary to its characterization by some courts,' 94 is not as simple as
eliminating from a list of possible causes the least likely candidates
until one cause remains. 195 It requires consideration of a host of other
factors, including some that are specific to the patient (providing
evidence of specific causation) and some that concern only the drug or
adverse event in question (providing evidence of general causation). 196
Thus, although some ADR differential diagnoses may serve only as
reliable evidence of specific causation, some may provide reliable
evidence of both specific and general causation. Whether any given
differential diagnosis does one or both depends on the type of data
available to and incorporated by the physician in making his causality
assessment. For example, a differential diagnosis based upon a very
strong and reliable showing of temporal proximity, de-challenge, re-
challenge, and exclusion of alternative causes, but lacking evidence of
a known response pattern or biologic plausibility, could be reliable and
admissible evidence of specific causation. That testimony, however,
does nothing in terms of proving general causation. On the other
hand, differential diagnosis testimony based upon all of the evidence
of specific causation, as well as evidence from which the drug can be
"ruled in" as a possible cause (e.g., a known response pattern, case
studies, epidemiological studies, animal studies, toxicological studies,
etc.), may provide not only solid evidence of specific causation but also
evidence of general causation. If, after dissecting the expert's
differential diagnosis opinion, the court concludes that the expert has
provided sufficient evidence "ruling in" the drug as a possible cause,
an ADR differential diagnosis alone may provide relevant and
194. See Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2001).
195. See generally discussion supra Part III.C (laying out the differential diagnosis
approaches).
196. See, e.g., supra Part III.C.2 fig.2 and accompanying text.
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sufficient evidence as to the plaintiffs entire causation burden. In this
vein, several courts have explicitly distinguished questions of
admissibility from questions of sufficiency in the evaluation of
differential diagnosis evidence of causation.197
C. Why Does the Distinction Matter?
This Note suggests that the exclusion of clinical medical
evidence of causation based on the expert's inability to "rule in" the
drug as a possible cause should be evaluated in terms of sufficiency.
This suggested approach derives from the application of the federal
standard for admissibility of expert testimony-most importantly,
from Kumho Tire-to the differential diagnosis methodology. In many
cases, however, the sufficiency approach to the "ruling in" requirement
ultimately leads to the same result as the approach taken by courts
that require a differential diagnosis expert to "rule in" the drug as a
matter of reliability. Specifically, if the expert has not "ruled in" the
drug as part of his diagnostic analysis, the result may be summary
judgment for the defendant either way. So, why is the distinction
between these two approaches even relevant?
First, the suggested approach appropriately recognizes that
differential diagnosis evidence may be reliable even without evidence
of general causation and, consequently, would be admissible if the
plaintiff offers additional testimony on general causation. The trend
emerging in recent case law threatens to permanently entrench
"ruling in" as a black-letter requirement of all differential diagnosis
experts.198 This requirement may result in the overexclusion of clinical
medical evidence of causation when the clinical physician, while
experienced in diagnosing and treating patients, is not qualified to
197. In McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
the admission of testimony from an expert witness who had conducted a differential diagnosis
and concluded that plaintiffs polyps were caused by glue fumes inhaled at her workplace. 61
F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995). No medical literature supported the expert's opinion. Id. Citing
Daubert, the court stated that all of the potential faults in his use of differential diagnosis go to
the weight to be accorded his testimony, not to its admissibility. Id. at 1043-44. Similarly, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, when evaluating the expert's opinion that
the drug Depo-Provera caused the plaintiffs birth defects, stated that "[tihe fact that several
possible causes might remain 'uneliminated' only goes to the accuracy of the conclusion, not the
soundness of the methodology." Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 140 (citing Mendes-Silva v. United
States, 980 F.2d 1483, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see also Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d
194, 202 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that the adequacy of the expert's consideration of other possible
causes is a question of weight); Globetti v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1179
(N.D. Ala. 2000) (same).
198. See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that differential diagnosis experts must "rule in" the drug as a possible cause and failing
to distinguish variations in differential diagnosis opinions); Glastetter, 252 F.3d at 989 (same).
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testify to general causation. Upon such improper exclusion, a court
may grant summary judgment for the defendant based on the absence
of specific causation evidence even though the plaintiff has presented
one expert who can reliably testify as to general causation and one
expert who can reliably testify as to specific causation. Thus, to
preserve the value of differential diagnosis testimony in proving
specific causation, it is crucial to distinguish between issues that are
matters of reliability under Daubert and issues that are better
conceived of as questions of weight.
Second, this approach more appropriately accounts for the
incredible variety in differential diagnoses and better reflects the
numerous complex considerations that enter a physician's ADR
differential diagnosis. A black-letter rule that the differential
diagnostician must in all cases prove general causation is based on an
oversimplified conception of the process by which physicians diagnose
an adverse drug reaction and is inconsistent with the Court's
prescription in Kumho Tire that an expert analysis should be
evaluated according to "the intellectual rigor that characterizes the
practice of an expert in the relevant field." 199
Third, appropriately treating the "ruling in" requirement as
what it is-that is, a question of sufficiency-rather than as an
admissibility question, allows the court to account for the variety that
exists in state substantive law with respect to the general causation
issue. 200 If, as this Note suggests, the utility of a differential diagnosis
that has not "ruled in" the drug in question as a possible cause is
indeed a question of weight rather than of admissibility, then the
court must consider applicable state substantive law as part of its
summary judgment consideration. 201 If the court's inquiry stops at
admissibility, however, there is no room for the court to consider the
applicable state law because federal procedural law dictates the
results. However, if the court's inquiry moves beyond admissibility to
sufficiency, the court can and should consider the evidence offered by
the witness in the context of the applicable state substantive law. As
an illustration of this point, suppose that state law differs with respect
to whether the plaintiff can prove general causation without
epidemiological evidence. State A may allow proof of general causation
if other causal evidence-for example, de-challenge data, re-challenge
data, exclusion of other causes, toxicological studies, case reports, or
199. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
200. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
201. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that when a federal
court determines whether to grant summary judgment, it must consider the particular burden of
proof prescribed by the substantive law to be applied).
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animal studies-is strong. State B, on the other hand, may require
epidemiological proof. Federal admissibility rules cannot account for
this difference-that is, if the testimony is reliable under Daubert in a
federal court sitting in State A, then (in theory), that testimony should
be reliable under Daubert in a federal court sitting in State B. As a
matter of sufficiency, however, a differential diagnosis opinion lacking
epidemiological support may be sufficient to carry the plaintiffs
burden in State A but would be insufficient to carry that burden in
State B. So, to the extent that state substantive law of general
causation varies, appropriately categorizing the "ruling in"
requirement as a question of weight respects that variation.
20 2
Finally, as a more general matter, the suggested approach
respects the language and intent of the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert. The Court explicitly recognized that the Federal Rules of
Evidence, provide for admissibility of a broader range of expert
testimony than had been admissible under the pre-Daubert
admissibility test.20 3 In Daubert itself, the Court stated that the
judge's role as gatekeeper does not supplant the traditional tools that
ensure that faulty testimony does not unduly influence the jury's
conclusions. 20 4 These tools include cross-examination of expert
witnesses and the use of summary judgment and directed verdicts. 20 5
According to the express language of Daubert, then, courts should
avoid using Daubert's reliability prong in lieu of the more traditional
tools. Imposing a "ruling in" requirement as a precondition to
reliability, as opposed to evaluating the evidence for relevance or
sufficiency, is contrary to Daubert's prescription.
In sum, a distinction between admissibility and sufficiency
with respect to courts' treatment of the "ruling in" issue is more than
mere formalism. Evaluating the differential diagnosis expert's
evidence of general causation as a question of weight respects the
applicable legal framework under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
follows the medical framework of ADR differential diagnoses, allows
the court to account for the variation in state substantive law of
202. This discussion, in light of the above description of the ADR differential diagnosis
methodology, suggests an interesting question: Should courts categorically require distinct
evidence of general causation (e.g., epidemiological studies) when clinical physicians may
justifiably conclude (albeit under rare circumstances) that a drug is the probable cause of the
adverse event without such evidence? The answer to this question cannot be found in Kumho
Tire, as it is a question of substantive law as opposed to evidence law, but perhaps substantive
law on causation could also better reflect the physician's diagnostic processes. That question is
beyond the scope of this Note.
203. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997).
204. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
205. Id. at 595-96.
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causation, and maintains the value of differential diagnosis evidence
for the purpose of proving specific causation.
V. CONCLUSION
The admissibility of expert testimony to prove causation is one
of the most difficult issues facing trial courts in pharmaceutical
product liability litigation. The admissibility of differential diagnosis
testimony to prove causation in pharmaceutical products liability
cases is particularly difficult because of the absence of a uniform
methodology for its practice among physicians. It is therefore
important to develop a consistent admissibility standard with respect
to this frequently utilized type of expert witness testimony.
One relevant issue that currently divides the federal courts is
whether a differential diagnosis opinion, as a prerequisite to
admissibility, must "rule in" the drug as a possible cause of the
adverse event. The Court in Kumho Tire instructed the trial court to
evaluate expert testimony according to the standards of a practitioner
in the relevant field. Clinicians conduct differential diagnoses
according to a multifactored approach by which no one factor, with few
exceptions, is dispositive. Thus, whether an expert has specifically
"ruled in" the drug as a possible cause-i.e., provided evidence of
general causation-should not be a black-letter requirement of
reliability. Instead, even in the absence of any general causation
evidence, reliable evidence of specific causation ought to be considered
a question of sufficiency under the applicable state substantive law of
causation.
Adopting such an approach will help to ensure that cases
involving the same product, the same defendant, the same expert
witnesses, and the same alleged injury receive substantially similar
treatment with respect to determinations of the admissibility of
clinical medical evidence of causation. Although Rule 702 and Daubert
give trial courts significant discretion in making their admissibility
determinations, that discretion should not remain entirely unbounded.
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